The fourth article in our Winter 30.1 issue deals with “Say on Pay” rules, those corporate practices giving shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. The assumption behind “Say on Pay” is that managers may be overpaid because directors fail to provide adequate oversight. Stephen O’Byrne questions this underlying assumption.
O’Byrne provides substantial evidence that directors do a poor job overseeing executive pay and that directors have weak incentives to pursue shareholder interests in executive pay.
“Say on Pay voting is sensitive to differences in pay for performance, but so forgiving that extraordinary pay premiums are required to elicit a majority ‘no’ vote.”
The common corporate practice of providing competitive target compensation regardless of past performance leads to low alignment of pay and performance. Unfortunately, directors have little incentive to protect shareholder interests “because they are paid labor providers, just like management, not stewards of substantial personal capital.”
Authored by Stephen O’Byrne, Shareholder Value Advisors